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The Genomic Research and Accessibility Act: 




¶1  This article discusses the recently proposed Genomic Research and Accessibility 
Act (GRAA), the creation of California Representative Xavier Becerra.  If enacted, this 
legislation will remove DNA from patentable subject matter in a broad stroke.  Part one 
of this article will introduce the gene patent issue and how it has regained the attention of 
Congress.  Part two will present an introduction on the science of DNA, gene 
patentability and a brief background of the important events leading to the current status 
of DNA patents.  Part three will introduce the language of the GRAA and analyze the 
reasons why certain scientific groups and members of Congress are convinced DNA must 
be removed from patentable subject matter.  This article will focus on the arguments put 
forth at a subsequent Congressional hearing on the issue of DNA patentability.  Finally, 
part four will conclude the article by discussing the fate of the GRAA, as predicted by the 
author. 
II. INTRODUCTION 
¶2  The first gene patent was granted in 1982 to the Regents of the University of 
California for construction of a plasmid contained in a bacterium and expression of a 
gene for a hormone that promotes maternal breast development during pregnancy.1  Often 
the topic of controversy, gene patents have recently become the subject of heightened 
media attention thanks to author and medical doctor Michael Crichton’s 2006 book 
“Next.”  While researching for his novel, Crichton arrived at some strong opinions on the 
subject of gene patents and subsequently published them in a recent New York Times 
column.2
¶3 Crichton’s article opens by striking fear into the hearts of the public: “You, or 
someone you love, may die because of a gene patent that should never have been granted 
in the first place.”
   
3
 
* Northwestern University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2010; Ph.D., Northwestern University, 2007. 
1 Gene Patents and Global Competition Issues, 26 GENETIC ENGINEERING & BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS, 
Jan. 1, 2006, available at http://www.genengnews.com/articles/chitem.aspx?aid=1163&chid=0. 
2 Michael Crichton, Patenting Life, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, at A23, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/13/opinion/13crichton.html. 
3 Id. 
  While certainly an effective strategy in fictional storytelling, 
Crichton’s alarmist assertions about gene patents have minimal scientific facts to support 
them.  After taking his readers through a few of the oft-cited examples of gene patenting 
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gone wrong (many of which are discussed later in the article), Crichton concludes with an 
endorsement for Representative Xavier Becerra’s GRAA (H.R. 977).4
¶4 This comment analyzes the research that is presented in support of the GRAA and 
the arguments for and against gene patenting.  Congress, and society, must decide if such 
legislation is merely reactive to an outcry of science fiction panic, or is necessary reform 
based on actual evidence and the needs of public policy. 
   
III. BACKGROUND ON DNA PATENTS 
¶5 In order to understand the nature of gene patents, some background on patent law 
and DNA as patentable subject matter is appropriate. We begin with a brief primer on the 
science of DNA. This primer is admittedly oversimplified, as the biology of DNA is quite 
complex.  Then we introduce a timeline of the more important events leading to the 
current status of DNA patents and outline the patentability requirements in the United 
States and its treatment of DNA to this point.  
A. Primer on DNA and Genetics 
¶6 DNA is a complex chemical made up of a sequence of nucleotides, each of which 
contains one of the four bases: adenine, cytosine, guanine and thymine.  One of the 
primary functions of DNA is serving as the source of the information necessary to 
produce proteins, which in turn provide the functions of a living organism.  Humans have 
around three billion of these nucleotides, arranged in a precise order in our chromosomes.  
¶7 A common definition of “gene” is a full-length DNA sequence that encodes a 
complete protein.  Accordingly, the term “gene patent” in this article will refer to a patent 
that claims at least a DNA sequence that encodes a complete protein or portion thereof.  
However, as will become clear later, arriving at a precise and accurate definition of “gene 
patent” is part of the controversy. 
¶8 There are various incentives for understanding how DNA processing works.  
Identification of the function of genes has the potential to provide great therapeutic 
benefit.  In humans, the primary focus is health care, which includes identifying and 
testing for genetic diseases, producing synthetic therapeutic proteins to replace defective 
natural proteins, producing other small molecule drugs that interact with particular 
proteins, and developing therapies to rectify or replace defective genes.5
B. DNA Patentability Timeline 
 
¶9  The double-helix structure of DNA was first discovered by Watson and Crick.  
Interestingly, they refused to patent this structure - a decision that advocates of removing 
DNA from patentable subject matter are quick to exploit.6
 
4 Id. 
5 Dianne Nicol, On the Legality of Gene Patents, 29 MELB. U. L. REV. 809, 812 (2005). 
6 Melissa L. Sturges, Comment, Who Should Hold Property Rights to the Human Genome? An 
Application of the Common Heritage of Humankind, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 219, 243 n.128 (1997). 
  Since its discovery, DNA has 
received differing forms of treatment by patent law.  However, there are several 
prominent cases and legislation that define the current state of DNA patents.   
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 0  
 
 294
¶10 Arguably, the most important event in the development of gene patents was the 
decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, where the Supreme Court held that recombinant 
microorganisms are patentable, which opened the door for patents on living things.7  The 
Supreme Court held that living organisms fall within the realm of patentable subject 
matter as long as they are “a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of 
matter – a product of human ingenuity.”8
¶11 The Federal Circuit confirmed DNA satisfied the Chakrabarty test in Amgen, Inc. 
v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., holding that “purified and isolated” gene sequences are 
different from those occurring in nature.
  
9  Amgen’s inventor did not have the “mental 
picture” of the erythropoietin gene until the gene had been isolated.  Importantly, the 
Federal Circuit understood and confirmed that DNA is a chemical, stating that “[a] gene 
is a chemical compound, albeit a complex one.”10
¶12 In 1980, Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act,
 
11 which encouraged universities to 
patent and commercialize inventions derived from government research grants.12  The 
Bayh-Dole Act further provided for the efficient transfer of patents on inventions arising 
from federally-funded research into the private sector, and granted university professors 
the right to file for patents on federally funded discoveries.  Accompanying the enactment 
of Bayh-Dole, and in the years subsequent to its passage, federal financial commitments 
dedicated to biomedical research dramatically increased.  As a consequence of these 
governmental actions, the number of patents assigned to universities increased from 264 
in 1979 to 3,259 in 2003.13
¶13 These events led to the 1990 founding of the Human Genome Project, the goal of 
which was to code three billion nucleotides contained in the human genome and to 
identify all the genes present in it.  The Project’s efforts have led to the discovery of 
approximately 35,000 genes.  The mid-1990s was a period of growth in DNA-related 
patents in the United States, at a rate of 50 percent per year.
 
14  Today, the biotechnology 
sector in the United States has reached gargantuan proportions, expanding from $8 billion 




7 447 U.S. 303 (1980).  
8 Id. at 309. 
9 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
10 Id. at 1206. 
11 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-12 (2000). 
12 See generally Roger D. Klein, Gene Patents and Genetic Testing in the United States, 25 NATURE 989 
(2007). 
13 Roger Klein, Gene Patents Jeopardize Genetic Testing, 27 GENETIC ENGINEERING & 
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS, May 1, 2007, available at 
http://www.genengnews.com/articles/chitem.aspx?aid=2092&chid=0. 
14 Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting 
Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091 (2006). 
15 Stifling or Stimulating – The Role of Gene Patents in Research and Genetic Testing: Hearing Before 
the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. 61 (2007) [hereinafter Gene Patent Hearings] (statement of Jeffrey P. Kushan, Biotechnology 
Industry Organization). 
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C. Stricter Standards for Patentability 
¶14 To decide whether the GRAA has merit, it is essential to have a base understanding 
of patent standards and how they have been applied to DNA.  The United States Patent 
and Trademark Office will approve a patent on an invention if it satisfies the statutory 
requirements of being “useful, novel, and non-obvious.”16
¶15 For a gene to be patentable, it must be useful.
  Generally, the standards for 
patenting inventions have become stricter due to the evolving jurisprudence in the 
doctrines of inherent anticipation and obviousness. 
17  Typically the utility standard has 
been easily met; however, in 2001, the PTO issued guidelines that demanded applicants 
identify a specific, substantial and credible utility for their inventions.18  The guidelines 
require the disclosure to have a scientifically credible basis of support.  The heightened 
utility requirements of the PTO guidelines were supported by the Federal Circuit in 2005 
in In re Fisher, which held that the mere potential for use in discovering a gene was not 
sufficient to satisfy the specific and substantial utility requirements of § 101.19
¶16 To receive patent protection, the invention must be novel.  Under 35 U.S.C. § 102, 
this equates to not being anticipated by the prior art.  An invention is anticipated if a prior 
art reference expressly or inherently discloses each and every limitation of the claimed 
invention.
   
20
¶17 To receive patent protection, an invention must also be nonobvious at the time of 
the invention to one of ordinary skill in the relevant art under 35 U.S.C. § 103.  In KSR 
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court disapproved of the manner in which 
the Federal Circuit applied the accepted teaching, suggestion, or motivation (TSM) test 
and suggested a less rigid application.
 The evolution of inherent anticipation may make it more difficult for the 
applicant to obtain gene patents.  The doctrine of inherent anticipation may preclude an 
applicant from claiming certain fragments of a gene if that gene is disclosed by prior art.  
21  The Court emphasized looking at secondary 
considerations, but did not provide a clear standard.22  This relaxing of the obviousness 
standard may make it more difficult to obtain gene patents.  A recent example is In re 
Kubin,23
¶18 The Patent and Trademark Office along with the decisions in the Federal Circuit 
and Supreme Court have raised the bar for obtaining patents on DNA.  Thus, obtaining 
patents over DNA is more difficult than it has have ever been.  Despite the adjustments to 
the patentability standards of DNA, some legislators believe that a more dramatic change 
is needed to address the issue.  As a result, there has been a recent push for legislative 
action barring DNA from patentable subject matter altogether, which is the goal of the 
GRAA. 
 where the Federal Circuit found that a DNA sequence was not patentable 
because, under KSR’s obvious-to-try standard, the prior art’s disclosure of the NAIL 
protein and antibody for NAIL rendered the DNA sequence of the gene obvious. 
 
16 See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-13 (2000). 
17 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
18 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
19 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
20 See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1576-78 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
21 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
22 Id. 
23 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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IV. THE GENOMIC RESEARCH AND ACCESSIBILITY ACT 
¶19 On February 7, 2007, Congressmen Xavier Becerra, a Democrat of California, and 
Dave Weldon, a Republican of Florida, introduced the GRAA to the House of 
Representatives.  Representative Becerra’s introductory statement illustrates the 
motivation for the bill, which seeks to “end the practice of gene patenting” by giving 
“guidance to the [PTO] on what is not patentable – in this case, genetic material, 
naturally-occurring or modified.”24  In Becerra’s view, this bill will “correct the 
regulatory mistake” that allows genes to be patented.25
¶20 The language of the GRAA is extremely broad, reading, “Notwithstanding any 
other provision of law, no patent may be obtained for a nucleotide sequence, or its 
functions or correlations, or the naturally occurring products it specifies.”
 
26  Though the 
purpose of the bill is to remove DNA from patentable subject matter, the bill is not 
limited to banning patents on DNA.  As the text reads, the statute promulgates a ban on 
patenting “the naturally occurring products [a nucleic acid] specifies.”27
¶21 Read literally, the GRAA would ban patenting of all naturally-occurring proteins 
produced by any means, including many critical therapeutic proteins such as hemoglobin, 
erythropoietin, albumen, and human growth hormone.  It would also ban any diagnostic 
assay that depended on detection of genetic polymorphisms, which are the genetic basis 
for many important diseases.  Dr. Kevin Noonan, a Chicago patent attorney, astutely 
notes: “In short, the bill would eliminate patent production for the molecules that are 
expected to provide the pipeline of new drugs for the next twenty years.”
 
28  Indeed, any 
trained scientist should realize that the language is so overbroad that it has the potential to 
cripple the biotechnology industry.  Intellectual Property Today columnist Steven 
Ludwig commented that “[w]hen I first read the scope of the exclusion, I thought I must 
have read it wrong.”29
¶22  On March 1, 2007, the bill was referred to the Subcommittee on Courts, the 
Internet and Intellectual Property.  Though not explicitly in response to the GRAA, on 
October 30, 2007 Representative Howard L. Berman held a hearing, entitled “Stifling or 
Stimulating: The Role of Gene Patents in Research and Genetic Testing.”
 
30  In his 
introduction, Representative Berman introduced the controversy over DNA patents and 
some of the arguments for and against them before turning the floor over to four 
individuals who presented testimony.31
 
24 153 CONG. REC. E315-16 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2007) (statement of Rep. Becerra). 
25 Id. 
26 H.R. 977, 110th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 2007). 
27 Id. 
28 Posting of Kevin E. Noonan to Patent Docs, The Continuing Threat to Human Gene Patenting, 
http://www.patentdocs.org/2007/10/the-continuing-.html?cid=86709402 (Oct. 16, 2007, 23:52 CST). 
29 Steven R. Ludwig, Attacking Gene Patents: Interesting Conversation – Bad Policy, INTELL. PROP. 
TODAY, Jan. 2008, at 8. 
  The testimony given at this hearing provided a 
framework to analyze the merits of the GRAA.  The GRAA can be contextualized by 
analyzing the arguments and supporting research on both sides of the gene patent 
controversy. 
30 Gene Patent Hearings, supra note 15. 
31 See Gene Patent Hearings, supra note 15, at 1-3 (statement of Rep. Howard L. Berman, Chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property). 
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V. THE ISSUES WITH GENE PATENTING 
¶23 Four members of the biotechnology research community gave testimony at the 
hearing: Marc Grodman, CEO of Bio-Reference Laboratories; Jon Soderstrom, managing 
director of the Office of Cooperative Research at Yale University and President-Elect for 
the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM); Lawrence Sung, a 
professor at the University of Maryland and partner at Dewey & LeBoeuf LLP; and 
Jeffrey Kushan, who presented testimony on behalf of the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization.  Each member discussed various arguments regarding DNA patent reform.  
Though each member endorsed some type of gene patent reform, none presented 
testimony in favor of the sweeping reform embodied in the GRAA. 
A. Patenting Life? 
¶24 Representative Becerra’s statement introducing the GRAA claims that “one-fifth of 
the blueprint that makes you . . . me . . . our children . . . all of us . . . who we are is 
owned by someone else.  And we have absolutely no say in what those patent holders do 
with our genes.”32  This argument has been the media darling and most inflammatory 
argument against gene patenting—that someone else can own your genes.  Indeed, 
Michael Crichton, as a strong supporter of the GRAA, chastises the current system that 
disallows donations of patented genes to a scientist of one’s choosing.  He blasts this 
disconnect, claiming “[the] gene may exist in your body, but it’s now private property.”33
¶25 This argument is known as the “universal heritage” argument, and its basic premise 
is that the human genome is part of every person, so it should belong to all humanity.  
The emphasis is placed on preserving the territory for future generations rather than 
focusing on current economic interests.
  
Further, web sites such as www.whoownsyourbody.org spark public anxiety over the idea 
that corporations own parts of their bodies through gene patents.  As Crichton has shown, 
this is great material for best-selling science fiction novels, but the question is whether it 
has any actual scientific or legal merit. 
34  Universal heritage theorists argue that genes 
are the product of millions of years of evolution and are thus the property of all mankind, 
not any one individual.35
¶26 In support of the universal heritage argument, the Canavan disease case is 
frequently presented.  Indeed, it is introduced by Becerra and Crichton, and is cited often 




32 See 153 CONG. REC. E316 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2007). 
  In that case, a family afflicted by a rare genetic 
disorder initiated an effort to find the gene mutation for the disease.  They raised money, 
collected DNA samples, and recruited genetic researchers to investigate the disease.  
They were successful, and the gene was identified in the late 1990s.  The researcher and 
his employer, Miami Children’s Hospital, obtained a patent on the gene and began 
charging royalties on a genetic test to screen for the disease.  Patient groups filed suit in 
2000, contending misappropriation of trade secrets by using their children’s DNA 
33 See Crichton, supra note 2. 
34 See Sturges, supra note 6, at 248. 
35 See Mark A. Chavez, Gene Patenting: Do The Ends Justify the Means?, 7 COMPUTER L. REV. & 
TECH. J. 255, 264 (2003). 
36 See Crichton, supra note 2. 
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without consent to obtain a patent.  In 2003, a confidential settlement was reached 
allowing certain laboratories to continue collecting royalties but allowing institutions, 
doctors, and scientists free use of the patented sequences.  Opponents of gene patents 
argue that researchers never would have found the gene without the efforts and the DNA 
samples of the afflicted.37
¶27 Jeffrey Kushan addressed this sensitive issue during the hearing.  First, he noted the 
important distinction that patents are not granted on genes or sequences, but novel 
chemical molecules.  Consequently, the term “gene patents” is a misnomer.
 
38  Following 
Chakrabarty and Amgen, genes as they exist in nature cannot be patented.39  Only after 
conducting research and establishing the utility of nucleic acids can they be patented.  
Under the PTO Guidelines40 and In re Fisher,41 the function or role of a gene must be 
elucidated before a practical application can be derived from the DNA comprising the 
gene.  The utility threshold of DNA can only be met upon the finding of a practical 
application, such as enabling commercial production of a desired protein the DNA 
encodes, or providing the basis of a clinical diagnostic tool.42
¶28 Kushan’s argument illustrates that technically any person’s DNA is outside of 
patent claims.  Since DNA must be isolated from the genome to qualify for patentability, 
it is impossible for any corporation or university holding a patent on a gene to own any 
person’s DNA.  However, Representative Becerra dismisses the Federal Circuit holding 
in Amgen that patent claims to nucleic acids require that they are “isolated” or “purified 
and isolated”
 
43 as “mere wordplay”.44
B.  Effect of Gene Patents on Innovation 
  Wordplay or not, it is clear that no company owns 
anyone’s particular genes. Companies own a patent on isolated DNA sequences with a 
practical application.  
¶29 The rallying cry of opponents of gene patents is that they stifle innovation.  Indeed, 
Becerra invokes this argument in support of the GRAA, stating “[r]esearch into disease 
cures is impeded when the holder of a patent on the disease gene prohibits other scientists 
from undertaking research involving that gene.  Patent holders have shut down genetic 
disease research projects at major universities.”45
¶30 At the outset of the hearing on gene patenting, Representative Howard Berman 
cited the examination of gene patents’ role in stimulating or stifling research as the 
central purpose of the hearing.
  This argument represents the most 
dominant policy concern against gene patenting. 
46
 
37 Denise Caruso, Someone (Other Than You) May Own Your Genes, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2007, at 3.3. 
  Berman mentioned that there is anecdotal information 
38 See Kushan, supra note 15, at 64. 
39 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) and Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 
1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991) for a discussion. 
40 See Utility Examination Guidelines, supra note 18. 
41 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  
42 See Gene Patent Hearings, supra note 15, at 65 (statement of Jeffrey P. Kushan, Biotechnology 
Industry Organization) (discussing In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
43 See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
44 See Becerra, supra note 24, at E316. 
45 Xavier Becerra, Talking Points, http://becerra.house.gov/HoR/CA31/Issues/genepatents.htm (last 
visited Feb. 20, 2008). 
46 See Gene Patent Hearings, supra note 15, at 2. 
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that suggests researchers have discontinued research because of the threat of lawsuit by 
patent holders, but then acknowledges that there is data suggesting just the opposite.47
1. Effect of Gene Patents on Research 
  
The two sides of this argument are well addressed by the various testimonies at the 
hearing, and we will examine the available evidence to determine which side is best 
supported by the data. 
¶31 In an oft-cited article published in the highly influential journal Science, Michael 
Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg hypothesized that patents upstream of final products could 
create an “anticommons” effect, encumbering research progress and access to resources, 
thus making it difficult to acquire sufficient intellectual property and stifling innovation.48
¶32 E. Jonathan Soderstrom addressed the anticommons hypothesis as it relates to gene 
patents.  Soderstrom pointed to several studies (discussed independently throughout this 
article) which show that “the licensing of DNA patents at US academic institutions has 
not led to the decline in academic cooperation and technology transfer that many 
observers have feared.”
  
They predicted that permitting gene patenting would restrict progress, inhibit academic 
freedom, and prevent scientists from working cooperatively.  Although no empirical 
evidence was cited, the idea quickly gained a good deal of attention. 
49
¶33 At the hearing, Jeffrey P. Kushan expanded on Soderstrom’s points against gene 
patents’ role in stifling innovation.  Kushan included an article written by Ted Buckley, 
the BIO director of Economic Policy, which contains some interesting empirical 




¶34 Buckley suggested that if the anticommons were occurring, we would expect the 
amount of research and development to decline.  However, since 1998, research and 
development of publicly traded biotech companies has increased over 60%, and between 
1995 and 2005 the amount of venture capital funding for biotechnology companies has 
increased 300%.
 
51  Employment in the biotechnology sector has increased 21% since 
1998.52
¶35 If the anticommons were occurring, research would be increasingly difficult, and 
the number of innovative therapies would be expected to decrease.  Buckley observed 
that the number of biological compounds entering preclinical trials in 2005 was 37% 
  Thus, instead of seeing what one would expect from an industry experiencing an 
anticommons effect, one observes an industry that is increasing research and 
development levels, as well as increasing employment. 
 
47 Id. 
48 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998). 
49 See Gene Patent Hearings, supra note 15, at 27 (statement of E. Jonathan Soderstrom, J.D., Ph.D., 
Managing Director, Office of Cooperative Research). 
50 Ted Buckley, The Myth of the Anticommons (May 31, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
the Biotechnology Industrial Organization), available at 
www.bio.org/ip/domestic/TheMythoftheAnticommons.pdf. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 3. 
NOR TH WES TERN JO URN AL O F TECH NO LO GY  AND IN TE LLEC TU A L PRO PER TY  [ 2 0 1 0  
 
 300
higher than in 1998,53
¶36 Other studies have revealed that minimal research-blocking effects of patents have 
been found. The National Academy of Sciences surveyed 414 academic researchers from 
universities, non-profits, and government labs to examine how patents have impacted 
their research.
 cutting against the anticommons theory that gene patents are 
stifling research. 
54  Interestingly, only 5% of these researchers regularly check for patents 
on knowledge inputs related to their research.55  Only 1% of academic respondents stated 
that they had experienced delays on their projects due to patents on knowledge inputs.56  
Even in areas of patent-intensive research where issues of access to intellectual property 
should be evident, only 3% of respondents reported stopping a project in the past two 
years because of a patent.57  The report concluded that there is “[n]o evidence that 
widespread assertion of patent rights on genes has significantly hampered biomedical 
research.”58
¶37 Advocates of reform are convinced that the rate of DNA patent infringement 
litigation is rising, providing another stifling cost to innovation.  This perception is 
derived from three reports warning of the consequences of industry stifling innovation.
 
59  
Further, Madey v. Duke University60
¶38 Professor Lawrence M. Sung addressed this issue at the hearing.  He is an advocate 
for change in gene patenting, yet his proposal falls short of the scope of the GRAA.  In 
response to the Madey fears, Sung proposed that the statutory clinical trial exemption in 
the patent infringement statute section
 opened the door for infringement assertions against 
universities and other public research institutions.  Since universities and public research 
institutions are generally less well funded than the private sector, the hefty cost of 
litigation is thought to hamper innovation at these crucial centers for biomedical research. 
61 should be expanded to include an exemption for 
research use.62  This proposal would immunize academic researchers and their 
institutions from patent infringement and establish a right to use patented technology for 
basic research without fear of litigation.63
 
53 Id. 
54 John P. Walsh et al., View from the Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCIENCE 2002, 2002-
03 (2005).  
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 See id.  
  Sung conceded that legislation may be needed 
in order to restore the balance between the interests of commercial exclusivity and public 
access to genetic technology.  However, perhaps in a thinly veiled response to the 
GRAA, he warned, “the potential for unintended consequences in any change to patent 
58 See Gene Patent Hearings, supra note 15, at 27 (statement of E. Jonathan Soderstrom, J.D., Ph.D, 
Managing Director, Office of Cooperative Research). 
59 See Ann E. Mills & Patti Tereskerz, DNA-based Patents: An Empirical Analysis, 26 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 993, 993, 995 nn.7-9 (2008) (concluding that “[t]he perception of rising rates of litigation 
derives from three reports warning of dire consequences if industry is unable to innovate and successfully 
commercialize new products” and citing those three reports). 
60 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
61 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2000). 
62 See Gene Patent Hearings, supra note 15, at 7 (statement of Lawrence M. Sung, Ph.D). 
63 Id. at 13. 
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laws, which may have disparate impact upon various technologies and industries, 
strongly suggests that such action should be approached with careful deliberation.”64
¶39 In 2008, Ann Mills and Patricia Tereskerz conducted a study to determine whether 
or not the rates of DNA-based patent litigation are actually rising.
 
65  They analyzed 211 
cases involving DNA-based patents issued between 1982 and 2005, finding that in 163 of 
these 211 cases (77%), a complaint was filed with no further action being taken.66  The 
authors suggested that the results “should call into question whether the perception of 
rising litigation rates is valid for some industries and whether this argument can continue 
to be used to justify patent reform without additional research.”67  The authors warned 
against broad scope legislation, especially “when passage of such legislation may be 
accompanied by introducing uncertainty as to patent validity, which may in turn 
discourage investment in younger industries and ultimately stifle innovation and 
commercialization.”68
¶40  The passage of the GRAA would compromise the status of the United States as 
the world leader in biotechnology and pharmaceutical innovation.  Patents on genes and 
recombinant or transgenic organisms have been vital to America’s preeminence in the 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries.
  This evidence weakens the argument for the necessity of a radical 
legislative response such as the GRAA.  Indeed, the authors explicitly warned against 
such a response. 
69  A recent Washington Post article by 
Joseph Fuller and Brock Reeve warns of the complacency of innovation in the United 
States.70  American pharmaceutical companies account for sixty percent of global sales, 
and seventy-five percent of biotechnology sales.71  However, just thirty years ago, half of 
the top ten pharmaceutical companies in sales were European, and in the early 1980’s 
European companies invented half of the world’s new drugs.72  Fuller and Reeve credit 
the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act and the Diamond v. Chakrabarty decisions as the 
source of this change in leadership.73  In contrast, Europe did not permit patents on living 
organisms until 1988, and the European Union did not encourage state-funded 
universities to pursue patenting.74  Fuller and Reeve warn that the restrictions placed on 
stem cell research in the United States could lead to falling behind other countries that do 
not have such expansive restrictions.75
 
64 Id. at 14. 
  It is not a far-fetched assumption that the passage 
of the GRAA could have a negative effect on the position of the United States as the 
world leader in biotechnology and pharmaceutical innovation. 




69 See Posting of Kevin E. Noonan to Patent Docs, The Continuing Value of Biotech Patenting, 
http://patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/2007/02/the_continuing_.html (Feb. 4, 2007, 16:24 CST). 
70 Joseph Fuller & Brock Reeve, Will We Lose in the Stem Cell Race?, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2007, at 
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¶41 The empirical evidence presented by Soderstrom and Kushan at the hearing refute 
the argument that research is stifled by gene patents.  The study by Mills further confirms 
that the existence of gene patents in specific areas does not deter decisions to choose 
research focus in these areas.  Though the Madey decision may leave universities 
vulnerable to patent infringement suits, the levels of litigation are not rising as feared.  A 
dramatic response such as the GRAA would cause significant economic harm, including 
the risk that the United States falls behind the rest of the world in biomedical 
advancement. 
2. Effect of Gene Patents on Research Sharing 
¶42 The sole argument that Becerra provides data to support is that gene patents have a 
negative effect on the sharing of research materials.  Becerra relies on a 2003 study that 
surveyed 1,077 doctoral students and postdoctoral fellows.76
Forty-seven percent of geneticists have been denied requests from other faculty 
members for information, data, or materials regarding published research. The 
practice of withholding data detrimentally affects the training of the next 
generation of scientists. Almost one fourth of doctoral students and postdoctoral 
fellows reported they have been denied access to information, data and 
materials.
  He states: 
77
¶43 Indeed, a recent study confirms data that shows problems with material transfer 
agreements are more prevalent than patents.  In this 2005 survey of 414 biomedical 
researchers in universities, government, and nonprofit institutions, 19% of the 
respondents reported that their most recent request for material was denied.
 
78  When the 
reason for noncompliance was analyzed, the patent status of the requested material had 
no significant effect on noncompliance.79  However, access to materials was more 
problematic in patented technologies than the random sample, with thirty percent of 
researchers not receiving their last requested materials.80
¶44 The sharing problem presented by Becerra is perhaps his best-supported argument.  
However, this problem is likely to be prevalent to all biotechnology and pharmaceutical 
patents, and not specific to DNA patents.  Becerra’s lone study compared life science 
with computer science and chemical engineering, but the existence of patents was not 
discussed.  Research endeavors in life science as compared to computer science and 
chemical engineering are quite different.  It is inappropriate to assume the only difference 
between these two disciplines is the ownership of patents. 
 
 
76 Christine Vogeli et al., Data Withholding and the Next Generation of Scientists: Results of a National 
Survey, 81 ACAD. MED. 128 (2006). 
77 153 CONG. REC. E315-16 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2007). 
78 See Walsh, supra note 54. 
79 Id. at 2003. 
80 Id. 
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C. Genetic Testing and Public Health 
¶45 Genetic testing involves comparing a patient’s DNA sequence with a reference 
sequence.  The Human Genome Project has made reference sequences freely available. 
Research investments have focused on development of novel test instruments, methods, 
and reagents.81
¶46 Becerra mentioned gene patent effects on genetic testing in his introductory 
remarks to Congress, stating: “Gene patents interfere with research on diagnoses and 
cures. Half of all laboratories have stopped developing diagnostic tests because of 
concerns about infringing gene patents.  One laboratory in four has had to abandon a 
clinical test in progress because of gene patents.”
  It is generally well accepted that genetic diagnostics have provided 
advancement for overall public health. 
82
¶47 Becerra relies on a 2006 study that investigated the effect of gene patents on 
various stages of research.
  
83  After finding very little evidence of any limitations on most 
research projects, the study turned to gene patents that cover a diagnostic test.  In this 
case, 25% of labs had abandoned one or more genetic tests as a result of patents.84  The 
patentee sees unlicensed lab testing as competition with his commercial activity.  Hence, 
it is not surprising that owners are asserting their patent rights.85
¶48 Marc Grodman, CEO of Bio-Reference Laboratories, supports Berreca’s concerns 
over gene patent effects on genetic testing.  He presented arguments as to why he 
believed that “exclusive licensing of genetic associations” should be barred.
 
86  Grodman 
presented two points of focus.  First, Grodman argued that exclusive licensing runs 
contrary to public health.  Second, he proposed a remedy to the problem, which lies 
within the Bayh-Dole Act.87
¶49 Grodman posited that competition in genetic testing is critical to public health.  He 
succinctly stated, “In the area of genetic testing, exclusivity is a formula for 
mediocrity.”
 
88  In one illustration, Grodman discussed the highly publicized Myriad case, 
which, like the Canavan case mentioned earlier, has become an often-cited case for 
patent reform.89  A genetic test for hereditary breast and ovarian cancer, based on full 
DNA sequencing of BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes to identify mutations, was developed by 
Myriad using an exclusive license from the University of Utah, which holds the patents 
on these genes.90 Grodman argued that these tests were not as comprehensive as they 
could have been if other researchers were permitted to create a better test.  Further, the 
test is expensive, in the range of $3,000, reducing the number of people who can afford 
the test.91
 
81 See Klein, supra note 
  To reinforce that the problem is not isolated to breast cancer, Grodman 
13. 
82 153 CONG. REC. E315-16 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 2007). 
83 See Caulfield, supra note 14, at 1092. 
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
86 See Gene Patent Hearings, supra note 15, at 107. 
87 Id. at 35. 
88 Id. at 41. 
89 Id. at 40. 
90 Id. at 34. 
91 Id. 
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submitted an appendix listing problems encountered due to exclusive licensing in the area 
of neurological disorders.92
¶50 The Myriad gene patent controversy undoubtedly provides a cautionary example of 
the negative potential of gene patents.  An analysis of the policy reports published after 
2002 shows that the Myriad story was, by far, the most referenced gene patent 
controversy.
 
93  The Myriad story was often used as a specific justification for patent 
reform.94  However, many policy reports and suggested reforms receive very little media 
attention, and one study provides data suggesting that the media coverage was 
responsible for driving a political agenda.95
¶51 Grodman’s solution to the exclusive licensing problem falls well short of the scope 
of the GRAA.  His proposal is to exercise the “march-in” powers of the Bayh-Dole Act,
 
96 
which empowers the federal agency funding the research (usually the National Institute 
of Health in most academic research settings) and provides licenses to other interested 
parties when the “health or safety needs” of the American people are not being 
“reasonably satisfied” by the patent holder or its exclusive licensee.97  Lawrence Sung 
also echoed Grodman’s calling for exercise of Bayh-Dole march-in rights.98
¶52 Interestingly, the NIH has never exercised its “march-in” powers, and has denied 
formal requests to march in.
 
99  However, in these cases, the denials involved 
pharmaceuticals rather than genetic testing.100  Grodman contrasted genetic testing and 
pharmaceuticals, pointing out convincingly that several drugs can effectively treat a 
disease, but most diseases only deal with one or a handful of genes.  The licenses would 
still be profitable by establishing a reasonable royalty.101  Grodman hedged his proposal: 
“I am not asking for a free ride; all I am asking for is the ability to compete fairly and 
benefit the public and my company.”102
¶53 One 2006 study suggests that the prevalence of exclusive licensing seems to be 
overstated.
  
103  The survey of technology transfer of DNA inventions reveals that 
universities actively promote licensing patent rights to biotechnology companies, but 
rarely grant exclusive licenses.104  Further, the report finds that the exclusive licenses 
granted are limited in nature, most frequently by “field of use” restrictions.105
 
92 Id. app. B. 
93 Timothy Caulfield et al., Myriad and the Mass Media: The Covering of a Gene Patent Controversy, 9 
GENETICS IN MED. 850 (2007). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2000). 
 
97 See Gene Patent Hearings, supra note 15, at 42 (statement of Dr. Marc Grodman, Chair of the Board 
and CEO, Bio-Reference Laboratories, citing 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2)).  
98 Id. at 10 (statement of Lawrence M. Sung, Ph.D). 
99 See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
100 Id.  
101 See Gene Patent Hearings, supra note 15, at 43-44 (statement of Dr. Marc Grodman, Chair of the 
Board and CEO, Bio-Reference Laboratories).  
102 Id. at 41.  
103 Lori Pressman et al., The Licensing of DNA Patents by US Academic Institutions: An Empirical 
Survey, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 31 (2006). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
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¶54 If gene patents can be read to cover genetic testing, then granting exclusive rights 
to genetic testing could be found to hurt public health.  Dr. Roger D. Klein, a medical 
doctor, attorney, and genetic testing advocate, admits that “given that almost all disease 
has a genetic component, this state of affairs bodes poorly for the future of healthcare 
generally.”106  However, Klein goes on to suggest that the legal threats on genetic testing 
may lack substance.  Current United States law does not permit patents on human genes 
or patents on correlations between genetic variants, which dates back to the prohibition of 
patenting of natural phenomena.107  The Supreme Court, most recently in Diamond v. 
Diehr, has repeatedly affirmed the natural phenomenon doctrine.108
¶55 Recently, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to rule on a case with direct 
implications for the validity or enforceability of gene-related patents that have restricted 
the development and implementation of genetic testing.  In October 2005, the Court 
granted certiorari in Laboratory Corporation of America v. Metabolite Laboratories, 
Inc.
   
109  The claim at issue was a method for detecting a cobalamin or folate deficiency in 
animals by testing a body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine.  Review was 
granted only with respect to whether a method correlating results can validly claim a 
scientific relationship used in medical treatment such that, after looking at a test result, a 
doctor infringes the patent merely by thinking about the relationship.  Regrettably, after 
oral argument, the Supreme Court dismissed the case.  Three justices, led by Justice 
Breyer, would have heard the case and would have found the patent invalid.  Justice 
Scalia commented, “[B]ut here what [claim] 13 involves is simply discovery of the 
natural principle that when . . . there is the presence of one substance in a human being, 
there is a deficiency of two other ones. That’s just a natural principle.”110
¶56 The natural principle doctrine prevents patenting of biological relationships 




¶57 Becerra’s argument that exclusive licensing has a negative impact on genetic 
testing may have some merit.  However, it is questionable whether gene patents are the 
source of these problems.  The GRAA is likely an overbroad response to this problem, 
and most commentators, including Grodman, argue that less invasive legislation is more 
appropriate. 
  According to Klein, so long as the courts do not expand the scope of gene-
related patents to include genetic testing, there is likely no legal risk to pursue these 
diagnostics. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
¶58  The GRAA faces an uphill battle.  Read literally, the language of the bill is far too 
broad.  In essence, the bill would ban patenting on all naturally-occurring proteins 
 
106 Klein, supra note 12, at 989. 
107 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853). 
108 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
109 546 U.S. 975 (2005) (granting the petition for writ of certiorari). 
110 Transcript of Oral Argument, Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921 
(2006) (No. 04-607), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument transcripts/04-
607.pdf. 
111 See Klein, supra note 12, at 990. 
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produced by any biological means.  It would also ban any diagnostic tool that relied on 
the identification of mutations in the genetic code.  This would include a ban on patenting 
all natural, therapeutic proteins and any diagnostic assay that depended on detection of 
genetic polymorphisms.  The bill would eliminate patent production for the molecules 
that are expected to provide new drugs, crippling the biotechnology industry in the 
process.  The GRAA does reference the important need for careful regulation regarding 
overbroad DNA patents, though a more detailed and less reactive legislation should be 
explored.  
¶59 Becerra simply does not know enough about the problem, as illustrated by the 
unreasonably broad sweep of the GRAA.  The proposals by the witnesses at the hearing 
reflect the concern that enacting revolutionary legislation is unwise.  According to 
Grodman and Sung, the solution may be available though currently available legislative 
means.  Indeed, all of the testimony heard at the October 2007 hearing warned of the 
delicate nature of this type of legislation and that much more research and deliberation is 
needed before this Act or any other is passed.   
¶60 The evolution of the stricter patentability standard, coupled with the available 
statutory regulation, is enough to handle the problems that the GRAA is proposed to 
solve.  While we should applaud Becerra’s recognition of need for reform, the indirect 
and debilitating effects of the GRAA will vastly outweigh the potential resolution of the 
issues Becerra presents.  Congress must prioritize analysis of scientific data before voting 
on such legislation, rather than responding to inflammatory editorials from newspapers 
and isolated, media-friendly case studies. 
